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MELISSA SEIFER BRIGGS*
Exempt or Not Exempt:  Mandated
Prescription Contraception
Coverage and the Religious
Employer
In 1999, the California legislature passed the Women’s Contra-ception Equity Act (WCEA).1  The WCEA requires all pri-
vate employers who offer prescription drug coverage in health
and disability insurance plans to include prescription contracep-
tion coverage for female employees and their covered spouses
and children.2  A “religious employer” may be exempt from the
requirement to provide coverage for prescription contraceptives
and may request health and disability plan contracts without cov-
erage for prescription contraception.3  “Religious employers” are
defined in the WCEA as those that have the purpose of inculcat-
ing religious values, primarily employ persons who share their
religious tenets, primarily serve persons who share their religious
tenets, and qualify as a nonprofit organization under
§ 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.4
The first challenge to the WCEA and its exemption for relig-
ious employers came before the California Supreme Court in
March 2004.5  Catholic Charities of Sacramento (Catholic Chari-
ties) did not meet any of the four criteria for the religious em-
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2006.  Managing Editor,
Oregon Law Review ,  2005-2006.  I would like to thank David Briggs for his encour-
agement, advice, and support.  My parents, Roger & Karen Seifer, and my entire
family have also earned my gratitude for their love and support.
1 1 1999 Cal. Stat. 92 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West
2000) and CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2005)).
2 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(a).
3 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d).
4 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.196(d)(1).
5 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
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ployer exemption.6  Catholic Charities argued that the WCEA
violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the United
States and California Constitutions.7  The California Supreme
Court disagreed and held that the WCEA was constitutional.8
In this Comment, I will argue that the religious employer ex-
emptions of the WCEA and similar state statutes mandating con-
traceptive coverage are too narrow.  The decision in Catholic
Charities  upholding the WCEA’s exemption will cause religious
employers who do not meet the exemption criteria to refuse to
offer prescription drug benefits to employees in order to follow
their religious tenets against contraception.  This will defeat the
purpose of mandated contraception coverage statutes by forcing
some women to pay more for health services.  Further, religious
employers will be less attractive to job seekers if they refuse to
offer prescription drug coverage to employees.
Part I of this Comment will provide an overview of the man-
dated prescription contraceptive coverage issue.  This Part will
explain the statistical and social factors requiring action to elimi-
nate discrimination in health care costs between men and women
and will give a brief summary of the concerns raised by religious
organizations.
Part II will discuss the various state, federal, and administra-
tive solutions to the problem of mandated contraceptive cover-
age and religious employers.  Part II.A will examine the various
state statutes mandating prescription contraception coverage, fo-
cusing on the exemptions for religious employers, the problems
with the exemptions, and the solutions different states have cre-
ated.  Part II.B will examine Congress’ efforts to eliminate dis-
crimination in prescription coverage for women.  Administrative
endeavors, specifically by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, will be considered in Part II.C.  And Part II.D will
look at efforts by the federal courts to guarantee coverage for
prescription contraception.
Part III will examine recent developments concerning man-
dated prescription contraceptive coverage, including the recent
California Supreme Court decision in Catholic Charities .  Finally,
Part IV will consider the implications of Catholic Charities .  In
Part IV, I will argue that the exemptions for religious employers
6 Id.  at 76.
7 Id.  at 73.
8 Id.  at 74.
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should be broader, with an option for employees to purchase
prescription contraception coverage directly from the insurer if
an employer takes the exemption.
I
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVE
COVERAGE ISSUE
A. Discrimination in Health Care Costs
Concern over disparities in health care costs between men and
women became a hot topic in the mid- to late-nineties.9  Around
that time, insurance companies that for years had refused to
cover prescription contraception began to offer coverage for
Viagra, a pill prescribed to men to overcome impotency
problems.10  Women and various members of the media spoke up
about the quickness by which Viagra was offered to men and
covered by insurance companies, even though contraceptives for
women still were not covered.11
At this time in the nineties, statistics showed that women paid
68% more than men for health care.12  The costs of contracep-
tives and other reproductive health care services accounted for
much of the disparity,13 as did unintended pregnancies.14  Find-
ings from a study of private insurance revealed that almost half
of large group health insurance plans did not provide contracep-
tive coverage.15  The same study showed that only 33% of the
97% of large group plans that covered prescription drugs cov-
9 See, e.g. , Breena M. Roos, Note, The Quest for Equality:  Comprehensive Insur-
ance Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives , 82 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (2002).
10 See, e.g. , Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive
Health Care System:  Viagra v. Birth Control , 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 180 (1999).
“The pill” has been available since 1960 when the Food and Drug Administration
approved distribution of Enovid, a contraceptive pill.  Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America, Inc., A History of Contraceptive Methods , June 2002, http://www.
plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/medicalinfo/birthcontrol/fact-020709-
contraception-history.xml.
11 See, e.g. , Sarah E. Bycott, Note, Controversy Aroused:  North Carolina Man-
dates Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives in the Wake of Viagra , 79 N.C. L. REV.
779, 779-80 (2001).
12 Center for Reproductive Rights, Contraceptive Coverage for All:  EPICC Act is
Prescription for Women’s Equality , Aug. 1 2005, http://www.crlp.org/pub_fac_epicc.
html.
13 Id.
14 NARAL FOUNDATION, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CONTRACEPTION 2 (2002).
Forty-nine percent of all pregnancies in the United States are unintended. Id.  at 2.
15 Center for Reproductive Rights, supra  note 12.
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ered oral contraceptives, and only 15% of those plans that cov-
ered prescription drugs covered the five most common methods
of reversible contraception:  oral contraceptives, diaphragms,
Depo Provera, IUDs, and Norplant.16  In contrast, insurance
companies covered over half of all Viagra prescriptions.17  Many
insurance plans also offered coverage for other services related
to pregnancy, including nonreversible birth control.  For exam-
ple, tubal ligations were covered by 86% of all private insurance
plans.18
Data indicates that the costs to employers for requiring equity
in prescription contraceptive coverage are minimal.19  If employ-
ers were to provide coverage for the full range of Food and Drug
Administration approved prescription contraceptives, the aver-
age monthly cost to the employer would be $1.43 per employee.20
This slight increase translates into an overall rise in insurance
costs for employers of only 0.6%.21  Further, estimates suggest
that not providing prescription contraceptive coverage “may in
fact cost an employer 15-17% more than providing coverage.”22
This increase is due to the costs of unintended pregnancies, for
which insurance companies generally pay.23  Thus, the costs of
16 Id.  Eight of ten women in the United States born after 1945 have used oral
contraceptives at some time during their lives. POPULATION INFO. PROGRAM, THE
JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, SERIES A, NO. 9, ORAL CONTRACEP-
TIVES:  AN UPDATE (2000), available at  http://www.infoforhealth.org/ pr/
a9edsum.shtml.
17 Center for Reproductive Rights, supra  note 12.
18 Id.  A tubal ligation is a permanent sterilization procedure where a woman’s
fallopian tubes are tied, preventing eggs from release during the menstrual cycle.
Hayden, supra  note 10, at 178.
19 E.g. , Rachel Benson Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private Insur-
ance Coverage of Contraception , THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY,
Aug. 1998, available at  http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/01/4/ gr010405.html.
These estimates are based on the actual experiences of employers whose insurance
plans cover oral contraceptives, and they illustrate the change in cost for employers
whose insurance plans do not currently cover any form of prescription contracep-
tion. Id.  Plans that offer some coverage for contraceptives would experience a




22 Susan A. Cohen, Federal Law Urged As Culmination of Contraceptive Insur-
ance Coverage Campaign , THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, Oct.
2001, available at  http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/04/5/gr040510.html.
23 E.g. , NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA FOUNDATION, INSURANCE COVERAGE
FOR CONTRACEPTION:  A PROVEN WAY TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE WOMEN’S
HEALTH 2 (2005), available at http://naral.org/facts/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/se-
curity/getfile.cfm&PageID=16208.
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mandating coverage are minimal and may even be outweighed by
the economic benefits of mandated coverage due to fewer unin-
tended pregnancies.
In the face of these statistics concerning the disparities in
healthcare costs between men and women, the burden placed on
women financially, and the combination of relatively low ex-
pense and possible financial benefit to employers, there are still
those who oppose mandated prescription contraceptive
coverage.
B. The Conscience Clause
The strongest opponents to mandated prescription contracep-
tive coverage are religious entities, especially those affiliated with
the Catholic Church.  Opposition stems from teachings of the
Catholic Church that prohibit Catholics from using artificial birth
control.24  The Catholic Church teaches that in order to follow
the natural law of God, “each and every marital act must of ne-
cessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of
human life.”25  This doctrine is based upon the Church’s belief in
the connection between the unitive significance and procreative
significance of the marriage act.26  The Church believes that the
marriage act not only unites husband and wife in loving intimacy,
but also provides them the opportunity to generate new life.27
Thus, the Church teaches that the use of birth control frustrates
the purpose of the marital act and, therefore, disturbs God’s plan
or design.28
To accommodate the Catholic Church’s belief that artificial
contraception is a sin, “conscience clauses” are often included in
legislation.  Conscience clauses permit health care providers,
some employers, and other entities to refuse to provide services
which are in opposition to their religious, moral, or ethical be-
liefs.29  The first conscience clause was the Church Amendment,
24 See, e.g. , Second Vatican Council, Gaudium Et Spes :  Pastoral Constitution on
the Church in the Modern World ¶ 51 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at  http://www.vati-
can.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_
gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
25 Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae  (On the Regulation of Birth)
¶ 11 (July 25, 1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/ encycli-
cals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html.
26 Id.  ¶ 12.
27 Id.
28 Id.  ¶ 13.
29 E.g. , RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE, WORDS OF CHOICE:
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which amended the Public Health and Welfare Act.30  The
Church Amendment, enacted in response to Roe v. Wade ,31 pro-
vided protection for individuals and entities who received federal
funds and opposed sterilizations or abortions due to religious be-
liefs or moral convictions.32  Similar laws were passed by forty-
five states.33
Conscience clauses are meant to accommodate religious free-
dom, but opponents of conscience clauses see them as “loop-
holes” that prevent information concerning reproductive health
from reaching women.34  Arguments over conscience clauses are




State legislatures, Congress, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, and federal courts have examined the issue of
insurance coverage for contraceptives since discussion over the
problem heightened in the nineties.  Part II of this Comment ex-
amines the efforts made by these bodies.
A. State Legislative Solutions
Statutes in twenty-three states currently require private insur-
ance plans that cover prescription drugs to cover prescription
contraceptives as well.35  Texas and Virginia, for instance, require
insurance companies to offer plans covering contraceptives to
employers but do not mandate that employers purchase the cov-
COUNTERING ANTI-CHOICE RHETORIC, http://www.rcrc.org/pdf/ wordsofchoice.pdf
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
30 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000); see  Christine Vargas, Note, The EPICC Quest for
Prescription Contraceptive Insurance Coverage , 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 459 (2002).
31 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe  held that laws making it illegal to procure an abortion
for any reason other than saving the life of the mother are unconstitutional. Id.  at
164.
32 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b).
33 Vargas, supra  note 30, at 459.
34 Id.  at 459-60.
35 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF CONTRACEPTIVES (2006) [hereinafter GUTTMACHER, STATE POLICIES], available
at  http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf.  Oregon also recently
proposed legislation mandating prescription contraceptive coverage.  S.B. 756, 73d
Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 2509, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2005).  The bills were still in committee upon adjournment of the legislature.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 7  6-APR-06 12:28
Mandated Prescription Contraception Coverage and the Religious Employer 1233
erage.36  Three other states require that when insurers provide
individuals or small employers with prescription drug coverage
the insurers must also offer contraceptive coverage.37
1. The Religious Exemption
Of the twenty-three states that mandate health insurers to
cover prescription contraceptives, fourteen have an exemption
for religious employers.38  At least three of these fourteen states
provide some sort of exemption for both employers and insurers
on religious grounds.39  Additionally, Nevada exempts insurers
associated with a religious organization from providing insurance
plans with contraceptive coverage.40  All but Massachusetts and
New Mexico require notice to enrollees concerning the refused
coverage.41  The notice required is either given by the employer42
or the insurer through enrollment forms and information.43  Ha-
waii requires that an employer must also provide information to
the enrollee concerning where the “enrollee may directly access
contraceptive services and supplies in an expeditious manner.”44
Some states restrict the exemption further.  For instance, in six
states the exemption does not apply to contraceptive devices or
drugs prescribed for reasons other than contraception.45  Addi-
36 See GUTTMACHER, STATE POLICIES, supra  note 35.
37 E.g. , COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-203 (LexisNexis 2004); see also
GUTTMACHER, STATE POLICIES, supra  note 35.
38 GUTTMACHER, STATE POLICIES, supra  note 35.  The proposed Oregon legisla-
tion contained no exemption for religious employers. See  Or. S.B. 756; Or. H.B.
2509.
39 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503e(b)(1), (e) (West Supp. 2005); 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m(b)(2) (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(4)(1), (3)
(West 2002).
40 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689B.0376(5) (LexisNexis 2003).  The statute requires
an insurer to notify enrollees in writing of the refused coverage. Id.
41 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 4W (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59A-22-42(D) (West 2003).
42 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2329(C) (Supp. 2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1367.25(b)(2) (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d)(2) (West 2005);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559(d) (Supp. 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-
116.7(c)(1) (Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2756(2) (2000); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c)(2) (West 2002); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(B) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-57(e) (2002).
43 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503e(c); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(6); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3-178(e) (West 2000).
44 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(c)(2).
45 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(c); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(e);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503e(d); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(d); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2756(2); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(3); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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tionally, California, Hawaii, Maine, and North Carolina do not
include contraception necessary to preserve the life or health of
the covered person.46  To further protect women, Hawaii, New
York, and Missouri allow an enrollee whose employer takes the
religious exemption to purchase insurance coverage that includes
contraceptives directly from the insurer.47  Generally, the cost to
the enrollee who takes this option must be no more than the en-
rollee would have paid had the employer not been exempted.48
These three states also require either the employer or the insurer
to notify the enrollee of this option.49
2. Religious Entity Defined
The most important aspects of these religious exemptions for
purposes of this Comment are the descriptions and definitions of
the exempted religious entities, which range from vague and in-
clusive to detailed and exclusive.  Vague descriptions include
such general terms as “religious entity.”50  Four other exemptions
have similarly vague descriptions.51  The less ambiguous term
“qualified church-controlled organization” as defined in 26
U.S.C. § 3121 is used in two statutes.52  The most detailed and
exclusionary descriptions of religious employers list statutory
definitional requirements for classification as a religious entity.
These statutory definitional requirements are the types of defi-
ANN. § 58-3-178(e).  Reasons other than contraception may include decreasing the
risk of ovarian cancer or elimination of menopause symptoms. E.g. , HAW. REV.
STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(d).
46 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(c); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(e);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(d); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2756(2);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3-178(e).
47 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(e); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(5); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 4303(cc)(2)(A).
48 E.g. , HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(e).
49 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(c)(2); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(6)(3);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(2)(B).
50 E.g. , N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-42(D) (West 2003).
51 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559(d) (Supp. 2004) (“if the required coverage con-
flicts with the religious organization’s bona fide religious beliefs and practices”); 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356m(b)(2) (West 2000) (“religious institution or organization
[and the statute’s requirements] violate its religious and moral teachings and be-
liefs”); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c)(1) (West 2002) (“if the required coverage
conflicts with the religious organization’s bona fide religious beliefs and practices”);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(4)(1) (“if the use or provision of such contraceptives is
contrary to the moral, ethical or religious beliefs or tenets of such person or entity”).
52 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503e(f) (West Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-
18-57(e) (2002); see also  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2756(2) (2000); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 4W(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
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nitions that I believe are too narrow and will lead to problems for
religious entities.  For example, California and New York define
religious employers as those which have the purpose of inculcat-
ing religious values, primarily employ persons who share their
religious tenets, primarily serve persons who share their religious
tenets, and qualify as a nonprofit organization under
§ 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.53  Arizona and Hawaii have similar statutory definitional
requirements.  Arizona requires that a religious employer must
primarily employ persons with the same religious tenets as the
religious entity, primarily serve persons with the same religious
tenets as the religious entity, and meet the nonprofit organization
requirements under § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.54  And Hawaii defines a religious em-
ployer as one that has the purpose of inculcating religious values,
primarily employs persons of the same religious tenets, is not
staffed by public employees, and is tax exempt under § 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.55
The most troublesome of these statutory definitional require-
ments are those that require religious organizations to have the
purpose of inculcating religious values and to primarily serve
persons who share the same religious tenets.  Many religious or-
ganizations do not focus solely on evangelism and the inculcation
of religious beliefs.56  The Catholic Church, for example, does
not separate social services from its core religious mission.57  In
light of that, the Catholic Church also does not discriminate in
the provision of services by serving only those who share the
same religious beliefs.58  In this instance, the Church’s role in
evangelism does play a part.  A religious organization affiliated
with the Catholic Church may not primarily serve or employ per-
sons who share the same religious tenets because one mission of
the Church is to share the word of the Gospel throughout the
world.59  Thus, strict statutory definitional requirements often ex-
53 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2000); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10123.196(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2005); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(A)(i)-
(iv) (McKinney Supp. 2006).
54 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2329(F)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2005).
55 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 2004).
56 See, e.g. , Susan J. Stabile, Religious Employers and Statutory Prescription Con-
traceptive Mandates , 43 CATH. LAW. 169, 171 (2004).
57 See, e.g. , id.
58 See, e.g. , id.
59 See, e.g. , id.  at 173-74.
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clude religious organizations such as Catholic hospitals, schools,
and charitable groups from inclusion as a religious employer.60
B. Congressional Efforts
1. The Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive
Coverage Act
First introduced in 1997, the Equity in Prescription Insurance
and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC), similar to many of
the state laws discussed in Part II.A, proposed to require those
health plans that offered coverage for prescription drugs to pro-
vide equitable coverage of prescription contraceptive drugs, de-
vices, and services.61  The EPICC would have also disallowed
health plans from denying enrollment to participants because of
the use or potential use of contraceptives by the enrollee.62  Ad-
ditionally, the EPICC would have prohibited penalizing or re-
ducing the reimbursement to a health care professional because
the professional prescribed contraceptives to an enrollee.63  Un-
fortunately, the EPICC has died in subcommittee each time it
has been proposed.64  The EPICC contained no exemption for
religious employers, which might explain its failure to pass.65
2. The Federal Employees Health Benefit Program
In 1998, Congress passed a law providing federal employees
with a guarantee of prescription contraception coverage.66  The
law requires that all Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
60 See, e.g. , id.  at 171.
61 Prevention First Act, S. 20, 109th Cong. §§ 301-304 (2005); Equity in Prescrip-
tion Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2003, H.R. 2727, 108th Cong.; S.
1396, 108th Cong.; Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage
Act of 2001, H.R. 1111, 107th Cong.; S. 104, 107th Cong.; Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 1999, H.R. 2120, 106th Cong.; S. 1200,
106th Cong.; Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of
1997, H.R. 2174, 105th Cong.; S. 743, 105th Cong.
62 E.g. , Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 1997,
H.R. 2174, 105th Cong. §§ 3(a), 4(a).
63 E.g. , id.
64 The EPICC has recently been incorporated into the Prevention First Act, but
will probably not fair any better in the 109th Congress. See Prevention First Act, S.
20, 109th Cong. §§ 301-304 (2005).
65 See  Vargas, supra note 30, at 457.
66 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
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(FEHBP) insurance plans cover prescription contraceptives.67
However, unlike the EPICC, which has not passed in Congress,
FEHBP does contain a religious exemption.  Specifically exempt
from the mandate are five plans.68  Other plans, existing or fu-
ture, may also be exempt if they object to contraception because
of “religious beliefs.”69  Additionally, plans may not discriminate
against doctors or other providers whose individual religious be-
liefs or morals preclude them from prescribing contraceptives.70
This mandate sets an important precedent for states and private-
sector employers.
C. An Administrative Agency Statement:  The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
In response to charges filed by two nurses against their em-
ployers alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act (PDA),71 the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) issued a statement requiring the employers to
provide prescription contraceptive coverage if they offered to
cover other comparable prescriptions.72  The two nurses alleged
that the health insurance plan offered by their employers failed
to offer prescription contraception coverage and, therefore, dis-
criminated on the bases of sex and pregnancy.73
First, the EEOC decision established that the PDA pertains to
prescription contraceptives.  The EEOC found that the PDA ap-
plied to contraceptives through the Act’s plain language, inter-
pretations of the statute by the Supreme Court, and the
legislative intent of Congress.74  As the EEOC noted, the PDA
requires equal treatment in all aspects of employment for women
“affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
67 ABBY L. BLOCK, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., BENEFITS ADMIN. LET-
TER NO. 98-418 (1998), available at  http://www.opm.gov/asd/pdf/98-418.pdf.
68 Pub. L. No. 105-277 § 656(b)(1).  The excluded plans are: Providence Health
Plan, serving Oregon and Washington; Personal Cares HMO, serving Illinois; Care
Choices, serving Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Michigan; OSF Health Plans,
serving Illinois; and Yellowstone Community Health Plan, serving Montana. Id.
69 Id.  § 656(b)(2).
70 Id. § 656(c).
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
72 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Commission Decision on Cov-
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tions.”75  This includes the receipt of fringe benefits.76  The
EEOC stated that this explicit language “prohibits employers
from singling out pregnancy or related medical conditions in
their benefit plans.”77
The EEOC also followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning re-
garding the PDA’s prohibition against discrimination related to
the ability of a woman to become pregnant, not just to the preg-
nancy itself.78  Noting that contraception is a means by which wo-
men control their ability to become pregnant, the EEOC
concluded that the PDA “necessarily includes a prohibition on
discrimination related to a woman’s use of contraceptives.”79
Because under the PDA an employer could not fire an employee
based on her use of contraceptives, it follows that an employer
cannot discriminate in providing health insurance benefits by de-
nying coverage of prescription contraceptives to women.80
Looking at both the language of the PDA and Congress’ intent
in enacting it, the EEOC found further support for the conclu-
sion that the PDA applies to prescription contraception.81  In
most cases, the PDA explicitly exempts employers from being
obligated to offer health benefits for abortions.82  The EEOC
noted that Congress, knowing that the PDA would apply to a
women’s decision to terminate her pregnancy, provided this ex-
emption for abortion.83  If Congress had meant to limit the
PDA’s application to contraceptives, an exemption similar to the
one provided for abortion would have been included.84  Thus,
from the PDA’s language, congressional intent, and rulings by
the Supreme Court, the EEOC determined that the PDA pro-
tected prescription contraceptives.85
Next, the EEOC found that coverage for prescription contra-
ceptives is required by the PDA.86  The EEOC noted that the
PDA requires equality in the “expenses related to pregnancy,
75 Id.  (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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childbirth, or related medical conditions” and those related to
other medical conditions.87  Therefore, since contraceptives are
used to prevent the medical condition of pregnancy, the determi-
nation of whether the employer’s health insurance plan provided
equal coverage for prescription contraception centered on the
plan’s coverage of prescription drugs, devices, and services used
to prevent the occurrence of medical conditions.88
The EEOC then noted that the employer’s health insurance
plan covered vaccinations, drugs to prevent certain medical con-
ditions such as high blood pressure, and screening tests such as
pap smears and mammograms.89  The EEOC stated that the
health insurance plan failed to provide the necessary equal treat-
ment for prescription contraceptives because prescription contra-
ceptives were not covered while similar preventative drugs,
devices, and services were.90
Ultimately, the EEOC found that the discrimination would vi-
olate the PDA whether the contraceptives were prescribed as
birth control or for other medical purposes.91  The decision states
that regardless of the purpose of the prescription contraceptives,
the insurance plan restricted the treatment options available to
women but not to men.92  Unfortunately, since Title VII and the
PDA only apply to employers with more than fifteen employees,
the EEOC decision does not extend the guarantee of coverage to
most women.93
D. Federal Court Decisions
1. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington was the first federal court to consider the issue of
prescription contraceptive coverage.94  Jennifer Erickson filed a
class-action lawsuit against her employer, the Bartell Drug Com-
pany, alleging that the exclusion of prescription contraceptives







93 See, e.g. , Vargas, supra  note 30, at 456.
94 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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crimination against female employees.95  Examining the language
of Title VII and the PDA, the legislative history of the statute,
and the relevant case law, the court held that Bartell’s otherwise
comprehensive insurance plan discriminated against female em-
ployees in violation of Title VII and the PDA.96
In Erickson , the court first looked at the language of Title VII
that prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, firing, or other-
wise discriminating against an individual based on “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”97  The court noted that the legis-
lative history of Title VII is not useful in determining congres-
sional intent concerning discrimination based on sex.98  However,
the law has been applied broadly and Congress has generally
only interfered with judicial interpretations of Title VII that re-
strict the law’s application.99  The court then discussed the PDA,
which amended Title VII, and Congress’ enactment of the
amendment following a narrow interpretation of Title VII by the
Supreme Court.100
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert ,101 the Supreme Court held
that a short-term disability plan which did not provide coverage
for pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate Title VII’s pro-
hibition against discrimination based on sex.102  The Court rea-
soned that pregnancy does not affect all women equally and,
therefore, held that pregnancy discrimination is not the same as
gender discrimination.103  Further, the Court found that the
short-term disability plan covered the same categories of risk for
men and women.104  Thus, the Court held that the plan provided
equal coverage to men and women and did not violate Title VII
merely because the disability plan was less than all-inclusive.105
The Erickson  court found that the enactment of the PDA was
95 Id.
96 Id.  at 1271.
97 Id.  at 1268 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)).
98 Id.  at 1268-69 (discussing the law’s focus on racial equality and the inclusion of
“sex” as a possible attempt to impair the law’s passage).
99 Id.  at 1269.
100 Id.  at 1269-71.
101 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute , Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
555, 97 Stat. 2076 (amending Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy).
102 Id.  at 145-46.
103 Id.  at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974)).
104 Id.  at 138.
105 Id.  at 138-39.
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in direct response to Gilbert .106  Congress specifically noted the
Gilbert  dissents of Justices Brennan and Stevens.107  Congress
discussed Justice Brennan’s argument that General Electric’s
short-term disability plan provided males with comprehensive
coverage while women were not given the same comprehensive
coverage.108  Justice Stevens’ position that the ability to become
pregnant is precisely what differentiates females from males was
also noted by Congress.109  Further, the Erickson  court found
that “[p]roponents of the PDA ‘repeatedly emphasized that the
Supreme Court had erroneously interpreted congressional intent
and that amending legislation was necessary to reestablish the
principles of Title VII law as they had been understood prior to
the Gilbert  decision.’”110
Next, the Erickson court addressed the PDA’s importance to
the case at hand.  Stating that the PDA was enacted in response
to Gilbert , the Erickson  court noted that the language of the
PDA does not specifically mention prescription contracep-
tives.111  However, the court also noted that in enacting the PDA,
Congress adopted a broad interpretation of Title VII, recognized
that there are differences between men and women due to sex,
and “required employers to provide women-only benefits or oth-
erwise incur additional expenses on behalf of women in order to
treat the sexes the same.”112  Thus, the court found that Con-
gress’ reversal of Gilbert through the PDA demonstrated that
coverage which appears equal on its face “does not excuse or
justify an exclusion which carves out benefits that are uniquely
designed for women.”113
Further, the Erickson  court looked to relevant case law to de-
termine if prescription contraceptives are covered under Title
VII and the PDA.  The court found that the Supreme Court has
affirmed that in Title VII claims equality is measured by assess-
ing the coverage offered to both sexes and the relative compre-
106 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269-71 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
107 H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Erickson , 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 n.6 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679 (1983)).
111 Id.  at 1270.
112 Id.
113 Id.  at 1271.
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hensiveness of coverage for each.114  The court also noted that
the Supreme Court has reiterated the idea, confirmed by the
PDA, that discrimination based on sex-based characteristics is
sex discrimination.115  The court stated that the Supreme Court
has determined that classifying employees based upon their abil-
ity to bear children, whether they are pregnant or not, is discrimi-
nation based on sex.116
After reviewing the relevant case law, the court stated that
“the law is no longer blind to the fact that only women can get
pregnant, bear children, or use prescription contraception.”117
The court then held that generally comprehensive prescription
plans that exclude women-only benefits violate Title VII’s prohi-
bition against sex discrimination.118
2. Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In 2002, Lisa Mauldin, an employee of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(Wal-Mart), succeeded in establishing class certification in her
claim against Wal-Mart for violations of Title VII and the
PDA.119  Mauldin claimed that Wal-Mart offered a health insur-
ance plan to employees that included a comprehensive prescrip-
114 Id.  (citing Newport News , 462 U.S. 669).  In Newport News , the Court found
that employers must provide complete health insurance coverage to the female
spouses and dependants of male employees.  462 U.S. at 685.  The Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company limited the amount of pregnancy coverage for
hospital stays for the dependants of male employees but provided full coverage for
the pregnancy-related hospital stays of female employees. Id.  at 671.  The Court
found that the plan violated Title VII because the protections afforded to married
male employees were less complete than the protections afforded to female employ-
ees. Id.  at 676.
115 Erickson , 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
116 Id.  (citing UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)).  In Johnson
Controls , female employees of Johnson Controls, which manufactured batteries,
were not allowed to work in positions that could expose them to lead, a primary
ingredient in batteries.  499 U.S. at 192.  The company was concerned that the lead
exposure could harm a fetus carried by a female employee. See id.  at 190.  The
Court found that the policy violated Title VII because it treated the reproductive
capacity of women differently than the reproductive capacity of men, since the expo-
sure to lead could also create health risks for the children fathered by male employ-
ees. Id.  at 198.  Reiterating its holding in Newport News , the Court stated that the
policy of Johnson Controls discriminated against employees who could become
pregnant and, therefore, must be considered sex discrimination as well because it
effectively dealt with all female employees as if they were pregnant. Id.  at 199.
117 Erickson , 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
118 Id.  at 1272.
119 Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A.1:01-CV2755JEC, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21024, at *54-*55 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002).
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tion plan covering drugs and devices to prevent illness or disease,
but did not cover prescription contraceptives.120
First, Mauldin claimed disparate treatment based on sex, alleg-
ing that Wal-Mart sets apart female employees for unfavorable
treatment in its provision of employee benefits.121  Second, she
claimed disparate impact, based on the claim that Wal-Mart’s
facially neutral policy of excluding coverage for prescription con-
traceptives has an adverse disparate impact on women, since only
women use prescription contraceptives.122
Mauldin moved for class certification, asserting her claim
against Wal-Mart on behalf of herself and all others similarly sit-
uated.123  She defined the class as “all women nationwide who
are covered, or have been covered, by [Wal-Mart’s] health insur-
ance plan . . . who use or wish to use prescription contraceptives
not covered by the plan.”124  Mauldin argued that because Wal-
Mart’s health insurance plan excluded prescription contracep-
tives the plan constituted facial discrimination; therefore, any re-
lief granted would benefit all members of the class.125
Wal-Mart argued that the definition was too vague and indefi-
nite for certification as a class.126  Wal-Mart asserted that the in-
clusion of women who “wish to use” prescription contraceptives
flawed the class as it would require too much inquiry into the
minds of every woman covered by the plan.127
The district court looked to the Erickson decision and certified
the same class as the Erickson  court had; that is, those women
covered by the plan who were “using” prescription
contraceptives.128
3. Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
Another federal district court denied defendant Daimler-
Chrysler’s motion to dismiss a female employee’s claim under Ti-
tle VII and the PDA for failure to cover prescription
120 Id.  at *3.  The plan did cover preventative drugs such as drugs to prevent high
levels of cholesterol, allergic reactions, and blood clotting. Id.
121 Id.  at *4.
122 Id.
123 Id.  at *2.
124 Id.
125 Id.  at *5.
126 Id.  at *17.
127 Id.
128 Id.  at *25.
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contraceptives.129  Cooley alleged disparate treatment on the ba-
sis of sex stemming from the exclusion of prescription contracep-
tives from DaimlerChrysler’s Health Care Benefits Plan.130  She
also asserted a claim of disparate impact, alleging that Daimler-
Chrysler’s policy of excluding prescription contraceptives from
its Health Care Benefits Plan, though facially neutral, adversely
affected women since only women use prescription contracep-
tives.131  DaimlerChrysler moved to dismiss the claim by assert-
ing that all employees were treated the same way and suffered
the same harm.132  Further, DaimlerChrysler argued that pre-
scription contraceptives were not protected under the PDA.133
The district court first looked to the language of Title VII and
noted that “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include
health insurance and fringe benefits.134  Then the court discussed
the PDA, determining that “discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy is a per se violation of Title VII.”135  The court also noted
that the PDA mandates equal treatment for all employment-re-
lated purposes and discussed Congress’ intent to reverse the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Gilbert  with the enactment of the
PDA.136
As for Cooley’s disparate treatment claim, the court denied
DaimlerChrysler’s motion to dismiss, even though the Health
Care Benefits Plan appeared facially neutral.137  The court found
that Title VII and the PDA recognize that women have needs
different than men based upon their sex, for which provisions
must be made to the same extent as other health care require-
ments.138  Further, Cooley alleged that contraceptives are often
prescribed to women for purposes other than contraception.139
Cooley also asserted that men were protected from all catego-
129 Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
130 Id.  at 981.  The Health Care Benefits Plan was provided to all employees as a
term and condition of employment. Id.
131 Id.  at 985-86.
132 Id.  at 982.
133 Id.
134 Id.  (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 682 (1983)).
135 Id.
136 Id.  at 982-83.
137 Id.  at 985.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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ries of risk under the insurance plan, while women were only
given partial coverage.140 Thus, Cooley argued, excluding pre-
scription contraceptives from the plan resulted in less compre-
hensive benefits for women, given that such medication
constitutes a portion of basic health care for women.141  The
court found these assertions sufficient to state a claim for dispa-
rate treatment.142
The court also denied DaimlerChrysler’s motion to dismiss the
disparate impact claim.143  To establish a prima facie disparate
impact case, Cooley needed to show that the employment prac-
tice in question fell more harshly, without justification, on one
group, women, than another, men.144  Because prescription con-
traceptives are only available for women, the court found that
the exclusion of prescription contraceptives from Daimler-
Chrysler’s health insurance plan would impact women alone.145
Therefore, the exclusion would fall more harshly on one group
than another.146
Thus, the district court held that Cooley sufficiently estab-
lished a claim of disparate impact under Title VII.147  Cooley’s
claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact survived
DaimlerChrysler’s motion to dismiss.148
4. Alexander v. American Airlines, Inc.
In contrast to the previous three decisions, one federal district
court has granted a defendant employer’s motion to dismiss a
claim under the PDA.149  An American Airlines employee, Alex-
ander, alleged that American Airlines violated the PDA by deny-
ing coverage for prescription contraceptives.150  American









148 Id.  Later, DaimlerChrysler agreed to cover prescription contraceptives after
negotiations with the United Auto Workers Union.  Cynthia L. Cooper, Women
Fight for Insurance Equity in Court, at Work , WOMEN’S ENEWS, July 1, 2002, http://
www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/957.
149 Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:02-CV-0252-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7089 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2002).
150 Id.  at *3.  Alexander also claimed that American Airlines discriminated
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Alexander suffered no injury in fact, she lacked standing to raise
any claim related to contraceptives.151  The district court agreed
with American Airlines and found that Alexander, having admit-
ted she never sought to use prescription contraceptives under
American Airlines’ health insurance plan, suffered no injury in
fact and lacked standing to pursue her claim under the PDA re-
garding contraceptives.152
Further, the district court stated in dicta that even if Alexander
had standing to pursue her claim, American Airlines’ motion to
dismiss would still be granted.153  The court stated that “[b]y no
stretch of the imagination does the prohibition against discrimi-
nation based on ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tion’ require the provision of contraceptives as part of the
treatment for infertility.”154  The court erroneously examined the
claim regarding contraceptives as related to and part of Alexan-
der’s claims concerning infertility, and not as a separate issue
concerning sex discrimination in the disparities between compre-
hensive health insurance coverage provided to men and
women.155
Finally, the court stated that the plan American Airlines pro-
vided to its employees did not cover prescription contraceptives
for anyone, male or female.156  Incorrectly, the court did not
even examine the issue of sex discrimination, but merely implied
that the provision of health insurance to employees was facially
neutral.157
In summary, these efforts by federal courts to interpret how
Title VII and the PDA apply to coverage of prescription contra-
ception are notable in that there is no mention of an exemption
for religious employers.  Seemingly, the mandate in Title VII and
the PDA against sex-based discrimination in prescription cover-
age found by some federal courts applies broadly to all employ-
ers.  However, if this can be seen as a victory for women, the
victory may not be as widespread as women would wish.  Title
against women by not providing coverage for pap smear tests and infertility treat-
ments and medications. Id.  at *2.
151 Id.  at *7.
152 Id.  at *8.
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VII covers employers defined as “person[s] engaged in an indus-
try affecting commerce who ha[ve] fifteen or more employees for
each working day.”158  Employers with fifteen or more employ-
ees encompass less than one-fifth of all employers in the United
States.159  In addition, Title VII does not apply to private insur-
ers,160 which provide coverage for nearly sixteen million Ameri-
cans.161  Thus, more widespread mandates requiring prescription
contraceptive coverage are needed to ensure equity in healthcare
costs for women.
III
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF
SACRAMENTO, INC. V. SUPERIOR COURT
A. Facts
As discussed above, in 1999, the California Legislature enacted
the Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act (WCEA), which requires
employers that offer health and disability insurance coverage for
prescription drugs to also offer coverage for prescription contra-
ceptives.162  The WCEA contains a narrow religious exemption
clause for employers opposed to contraceptives based upon their
moral and religious tenets.163  Because of the narrowness of the
WCEA’s religious exemption clause, Catholic Charities of Sacra-
mento (Catholic Charities) sought a declaratory judgment and
preliminary injunction declaring the law unconstitutional and
barring its enforcement.164
Catholic Charities is an independently incorporated nonprofit
corporation operated for the public benefit, which “describes it-
self as ‘operated in connection with the Roman Catholic Bishop
of Sacramento’ and as ‘an organ of the Roman Catholic
Church.’”165  However, Catholic Charities does not meet any of
158 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
159 Roos, supra  note 9, at 1310.  Title VII does not reach the fourteen million
Americans who work for small employers. Id.
160 Id.  (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
161 Id.
162 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a) (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.196(a) (West 2005).
163 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d).
For further analysis of the WCEA’s religious exemption, see supra  Part II.A.1.
164 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 76 (Cal.
2004).
165 Id.  at 75.
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the four statutory requirements for the religious employer ex-
emption under the WCEA.166  For example, instead of the incul-
cation of religious values, Catholic Charities describes its
purpose as offering social services to the community and the gen-
eral public.167  Catholic Charities also employs persons who do
not share its belief in the Roman Catholic faith.168  Further,
Catholic Charities serves persons who do not particularly share
its Roman Catholic religious beliefs, but those who represent any
and all faiths.169  Finally, Catholic Charities does not fall under
§ 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.170
Prior to the enactment of the WCEA, Catholic Charities pro-
vided health insurance to its employees, including prescription
drug coverage.171  Prescription contraceptives, however, were not
covered by Catholic Charities’ health insurance plan because
Catholic Charities follows the religious teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church.172  The Church considers contraception to be a
sin.173  As such, Catholic Charities felt that offering prescription
contraceptive coverage in its health insurance plan would be fa-
cilitating sin.174  However, Catholic Charities also felt obliged to
follow the religious teachings of the Catholic Church concerning
an employer’s “moral obligation at all times to consider the well-
being of its employees and to offer just wages and benefits in
order to provide a dignified livelihood for the employee and his
or her family.”175  Catholic Charities found neither the option of
providing insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives nor
the option of denying coverage for any and all prescription drugs
166 Id.  at 76.  Catholic Charities acknowledged in its complaint that it did not meet
the statutory definition. Id.
167 Id.  Catholic Charities sought “to reduce the causes and results of poverty, and
to build healthy communities through social service programs such as counseling,
mental health and immigration services, low-income housing, and supportive social
services to the poor and vulnerable.” Id.
168 Id.  As explanation, Catholic Charities stated that it employs persons from a
diverse group with many different religious beliefs, but who all share in the commit-
ment Catholic Charities has made to support a just and compassionate community
that encourages and seeks to develop the dignity of individuals and families. Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.  Catholic Charities is an exempt organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
Id.




175 Id.  at 76.
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under its health insurance plan to be consistent with its beliefs.176
Bringing an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive re-
lief, Catholic Charities was denied relief by the Superior Court
and Court of Appeals of California.177  Catholic Charities ap-
pealed to the California Supreme Court, challenging the WCEA
under the establishment and free exercise clauses of the United
States and California Constitutions.178  Catholic Charities argued
that the WCEA impermissibly interfered with the autonomy of
religious organizations, impermissibly burdened Catholic Chari-
ties’ right of free exercise, and failed even the rational basis
test.179
B. California Supreme Court Decision
1. Establishment Clause Analysis
In Catholic Charities , the California Supreme Court began its
analysis with Catholic Charities’ claims that the WCEA violated
the Establishment Clause.  First, the court examined Catholic
Charities’ contention that “the WCEA impermissibly inter-
fere[ed] with matters of religious doctrine and internal church
governance.”180  Catholic Charities claimed that the WCEA con-
tradicted the church property cases by rejecting the decision of
the Catholic Church that contraception is sinful.181  However,
the court held that the case did not involve issues of internal
church governance, but merely “the relationship between a non-
profit public benefit corporation and its employees, most of
whom do not belong to the Catholic Church.”182  Therefore, the
court reasoned that even though the WCEA clashed with the re-
ligious beliefs of Catholic Charities, the California Legislature





180 Id.  To support this claim, Catholic Charities invoked the rule of the “church
property cases,” which states that the state must accept the decision of appropriate
church authorities on such matters as religious doctrine and internal church govern-
ance. Id.  (citing, e.g., Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960)).
181 Id.  at 77.
182 Id.  Seventy-four percent of Catholic Charities’ employees are not Catholic.
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 183
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d , 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
183 Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 77.  The court stated as explanation that “Con-
gress has created, and the high court has resolved, similar conflicts between employ-
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Next, the court evaluated Catholic Charities’ argument that,
through the WCEA, the legislature intervened in a religious con-
flict concerning the Catholic Church by taking the side of those
who oppose the Church’s teachings regarding contraception.184
To support this argument, Catholic Charities pointed to a state-
ment from a supporter of the WCEA on the floor of the state
senate, in which the senator cited a poll showing that not all
Catholic women agree with the Church’s teachings regarding
contraception.185  The senator agreed with the poll’s findings that
“someone who practices artificial birth control can still be a good
Catholic,” and stated that it was “time to do the right thing.”186
In examining this argument, the California Supreme Court
agreed that the state cannot lend its power to one side over an-
other in controversies concerning religious authority or dogma,
but then found that one senator’s remarks were not necessarily
the motivation for the entire legislature.187  The court found that
other legislators might have voted for the WCEA to eliminate
discrimination in healthcare costs without regard to the religious
controversy over contraception.188
The court then addressed Catholic Charities’ argument that
the four statutory criteria for the religious exemption allowed the
government to “premise[ ] a religious institution’s eligibility for
an exemption from government regulation upon whether the ac-
tivities of the institution are deemed by the government to be
‘religious’ or ‘secular,’” in violation of the First Amendment.189
The court stated that this argument lacked merit because the
United States Supreme Court has long acknowledged it is per-
missible for legislation to alleviate significant governmentally
created burdens on religious exercise.190  According to the court,
this permissible legislative purpose would not be possible if gov-
ernments were forbidden from distinguishing between the relig-
ious organizations and actions that are entitled to the
ment law and religious beliefs without deciding religious questions and without
reference to the church property cases.” Id.  (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-06 (1985); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-
61 (1982)).





189 Id.  at 79.
190 Id.
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accommodation and the secular ones that are not.191
Next, Catholic Charities asserted that the WCEA’s religious
exemption violated the Establishment Clause by requiring a
complicated inquiry into the religious purpose of the employer
and the religious beliefs of the employer’s employees and cli-
ents.192  This argument stemmed from the Establishment Clause
test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman .193  The California Supreme Court noted that recent
opinions have criticized laws that provoke governmental entan-
glement and inquiry into the religious beliefs of a person or insti-
tution.194  However, the court held that in this case no entangling
inquiry into the religious beliefs of Catholic Charities, its employ-
ees, or its clients was necessary because Catholic Charities con-
ceded that it did not meet any of the statutory requirements and,
therefore, no inquiry had occurred or was likely to occur.195  The
court conceded that another case with a different employer may
require an entangling inquiry, but held that, as applied to Catho-
lic Charities, the Establishment Clause was not violated.196
2. Free Exercise Analysis
Next, the California Supreme Court analyzed Catholic Chari-
ties’ claims under the free exercise clauses of the United States
and California Constitutions.  Catholic Charities argued that the
WCEA requirement that employers offer coverage for prescrip-
tion contraceptives if other prescription drugs are covered forced
Catholic Charities to violate its religious beliefs in violation of
191 Id.  Then the court noted laws containing such distinctions that have been
found constitutional. Id.  (citing, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (upholding
the statutory exemption of “religious” employers from liability for religious discrimi-
nation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)); E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California,
13 P.3d 1122, 1140 (Cal. 2000) (upholding certain state laws exempting “religiously
affiliated” organizations from landmark preservation laws).
192 Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 80.
193 Id.  at 80 n.6 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).  There are three
prongs to the Lemon  test:  (1) whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose;
(2) whether the principal or primary effect of the statute is one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) whether the statute fosters an “excessive government
entanglement with religion.” Lemon , 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
194 Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 80 (citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828
(2000) (plurality opinion); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1342-48
(D.C. Cir. 2002)).
195 Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 80-81.
196 Id.
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the Free Exercise Clause.197  To analyze this argument, the court
looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division
v. Smith .198  The Catholic Charities  court stated that the Smith
rule, at first glance, appeared to dismiss Catholic Charities’ free
exercise claim.199  Since the WCEA applied neutrally and gener-
ally to all employers, the court reasoned that the law did not vio-
late the Smith  rule.200  The court then noted that Catholic
Charities argued four grounds for applying strict scrutiny to the
WCEA under exceptions to the general Smith rule.201
First, Catholic Charities argued that the “WCEA should not be
considered neutral or generally applicable and should, thus, be
subject to strict scrutiny under an exception to the rule of
Smith .”202  To support this argument, Catholic Charities claimed
that the WCEA showed lack of neutrality on its face.203  Catholic
Charities argued that the language of the WCEA included relig-
ious terms that lacked any secular meaning or purpose, illustrat-
ing a facial lack of neutrality.204  The court rejected this
argument, holding that the law used religious terms and termi-
nology “in order to identify and exempt  those organizations from
an otherwise generally applicable duty.”205
Catholic Charities’ second argument for strict scrutiny of the
197 Id.  at 81.
198 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The rule of Smith  requires compliance, regardless of re-
ligious beliefs, with otherwise valid laws that regulate matters that the government is
free to regulate. Id.  at 877-82.  The Supreme Court stated that “the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” Id.  at 879 (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).  The
Court reasoned that permitting religious beliefs to excuse compliance with the law
would allow religious beliefs to become superior to all laws and citizens with relig-
ious beliefs to become laws unto themselves. Id.





204 Id.  at 83.  Catholic Charities referred specifically to the terms “inculcation of
religious values” and “religious tenets.” Id.
205 Id.  The court rejected Catholic Charities’ reliance on Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  In Lukumi , the Supreme Court
held that a law prohibiting the killing of animals for sacrificial purposes but allowing
it for pleasure purposes such as hunting is unconstitutional. Id.  at 542. The Catholic
Charities court reasoned that Lukumi was inapposite because Lukumi struck down
a law that “referred to religious practices (‘sacrifice’ and ‘ritual’) in order to prohibit
them.” Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 83.
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WCEA was that the legislative history and practical effect of the
WCEA demonstrated the legislature’s attempt to “gerrymander”
the law to affect only Catholic employers.206  Catholic Charities
argued that the WCEA discriminated against the Catholic
Church and any religious organization engaged in charitable
work, as opposed to purely evangelical work, in an effort by the
legislature to deny the religious exemption to Catholic
organizations.207
The California Supreme Court found no merit in this argu-
ment, since it was at the request of Catholic organizations that
the religious employer exemption was included in the WCEA.208
The court stated that the mere fact that the religious exemption
was not broad enough to cover all Catholic-affiliated organiza-
tions did not imply discrimination against the Catholic Church.209
In fact, the court noted that the exemption could be viewed as an
acceptable benefit to the Catholic Church since it is the only
religious organization identified as being opposed to
contraception.210
Third, Catholic Charities argued that the WCEA deserved
strict scrutiny because it violated “hybrid rights.”211  “Hybrid
rights” is a theory derived from the United States Supreme
Court’s Smith  decision.212  In Smith , the Court noted that the
only cases that had successfully established a First Amendment
violation when a neutral and generally applicable law applied to
religiously motivated actions  involved claims under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause in tandem with other constitutional protections.213
Thus, Catholic Charities argued that the WCEA violated the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Establish-
206 Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 82.
207 Id.  at 84.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.  at 84 n.9.  The court noted that this type of benefit does not violate the
Establishment Clause because it is intended to alleviate a governmentally created
burden, as discussed above. Id. ; see also  discussion supra  Part II.B.2.
211 Id.  at 87.
212 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  In Smith , employees were
denied unemployment benefits after being terminated from their employment for
the use of peyote during a religious ceremony. Id.  at 882-83.  The Supreme Court
held that the neutral and generally applicable law against the use of controlled sub-
stances did not violate the employees’ religious rights of free exercise. Id.  at 890.
213 Id.  at 881.  The Court called this a “hybrid situation.” Id.  at 882.  The Court
has not elaborated on the hybrid rights theory or invoked it as a justification to
apply strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim. See Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 88.
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ment Clauses.214
After criticizing the hybrid rights theory, the California Su-
preme Court analyzed the hybrid rights claim by assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the theory was valid.215  In doing so,
the court held that Catholic Charities did not allege a meritorious
constitutional claim to establish a hybrid rights argument.216
Catholic Charities argued that the WCEA’s mandate requiring
prescription contraceptive coverage violated the Free Speech
Clause by forcing Catholic Charities to engage in symbolic
speech it found objectionable through the implied endorsement
of contraception.217  Catholic Charities asserted that providing
insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives would be
viewed as an endorsement of contraception.218 The court held
that in complying with the WCEA, Catholic Charities would not
be forced to engage in speech because Catholic Charities would
be free to denounce the use of contraception and encourage its
employees to denounce contraceptives as well.219  The court
stated that the rule proposed by Catholic Charities’ argument
would allow each individual to choose which laws to obey and
which not to obey simply by declaring his agreement or
disagreement.220
Finally, Catholic Charities’ fourth argument for strict scrutiny
under an exception to the Smith rule asserted that strict scrutiny
was required under the California Constitution.221  Catholic
Charities argued that California’s free exercise clause prohibited
the state from burdening the practice of religion, incidentally or
not, if the law did not serve a compelling state interest and was
not narrowly tailored to meet that interest.222  The court decided
to apply strict scrutiny to review the claim under California’s free
214 Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 87-88.
215 Id.  at 88.
216 Id.  The court declined to discuss the hybrid rights claim regarding the Estab-
lishment Clause because that claim had already been determined to lack merit. Id.
at 89 n.15.
217 Id.  at 88.
218 Id.
219 Id.  at 89.
220 Id.
221 Id.  The California free exercise clause reads:  “Free exercise and enjoyment of
religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed.  This liberty of con-
science does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the State.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
222 Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 89.
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exercise clause.223  Under the strict scrutiny standard applied, “a
law could not be applied in a manner that substantially burdened
a religious belief or practice unless the state showed that the law
represented the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
interest or, in other words, was narrowly tailored.”224
Applying strict scrutiny, the court first considered whether
Catholic Charities’ beliefs were, in fact, burdened by the
WCEA.225  The court noted that requiring Catholic Charities to
offer coverage for prescription contraceptives would be relig-
iously unacceptable to the organization, but stated that Catholic
Charities could avoid the burden by simply not offering coverage
for any prescription drugs.226  Catholic Charities argued that this
solution would be unacceptable because of its religious beliefs,
which require it to offer benefits to its employees “as a matter of
justice and charity.”227  The court then stated that a determina-
tion as to the validity of “justice and charity” as firmly held relig-
ious beliefs was required.228  However, in order to avoid putting
itself in the position of determining the plausibility of a religious
claim, the court decided to assume that the WCEA substantially
burdened Catholic Charities’ religious beliefs or practices.229
Nevertheless, the court found that the WCEA served a com-
pelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to meet that in-
terest.230  The court held that the WCEA served the compelling
state interest of eliminating discrimination based on sex.231  After
reviewing statistical evidence of discrimination in healthcare
costs between the sexes, Title VII and the PDA, and the Erickson
decision, the court reasoned that eliminating gender discrimina-
tion was compelling.232  The court also noted that any exemption
from the WCEA reduced the number of women protected from
223 Id.  at 89-91 (discussing the various tests that have been used and determining
that strict scrutiny should apply here because Catholic Charities’ challenge would
fail under strict scrutiny or a lower standard and, therefore, the decision of which
scrutiny to apply should await a case where the decision will effect the outcome).
224 Id.  at 91.
225 Id.
226 Id.  at 92.
227 Id.
228 Id.  The court noted that a free exercise claim “must be ‘rooted in religious
belief’ and not on ‘philosophical’ choices.” Id.  (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406




232 Id.  at 92-93.
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gender discrimination.233  Thus, the means were narrowly tai-
lored to the state’s compelling interest because any broader ex-
emption would increase the number of women subject to gender
discrimination.234
3. Rational Basis Analysis
Catholic Charities’ final challenge argued that the WCEA
failed the rational basis test.235  In particular, Catholic Charities
argued that the definition of “religious employer” in the
WCEA’s religious exemption was arbitrary.236  Specifically,
Catholic Charities asserted that, in effect, the definition chosen
by the legislature implied that any religious organization that em-
ployed persons of other faiths or served persons of other faiths,
“in effect any ‘missionary’ church or church with social out-
reach,” would not qualify for exemption because it would not be
sufficiently religious.237  Catholic Charities argued that these dis-
tinctions were completely unrelated to any legitimate state inter-
est.238  However, the court found that the definition for religious
employers in the WCEA “rationally serve[d] the legitimate inter-
est of complying with the rule barring interference with the rela-
tionship between a church and its ministers.”239
Interestingly, though the court held that the WCEA passed ra-
tional basis review, the court did note that the third criterion to
be a “religious employer” under the WCEA was problematic.240
The court found it difficult to imagine a legitimate purpose for
the requirement that religious employers “serve[ ] primarily per-
sons who share the religious tenets of the entity.”241  In fact, the
court stated that the California Legislature may want to address
the issue, but then reiterated that Catholic Charities could not
233 Id.  at 93.





239 Id.  The court noted that the “ministerial exception” has survived the Smith
decision in federal courts. Id.  (citing, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episco-
pal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1302-04 (11th Cir. 2000)).
240 Id.  at 95.
241 Id.  (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(C) (West 2000)).
The court hypothesized that a soup kitchen, which inculcated religious values to
those who ate there and operated entirely by ministers of a church, would lose its
claim to a religious exemption if it did not discriminate in determining to whom food
was served. Id.
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challenge the WCEA, in any case, because Catholic Charities
conceded that it did not meet any of the criteria.242
IV
IMPLICATIONS
A. Possible Consequences of Catholic Charities
As Catholic Charities  illustrates, narrow exemptions for relig-
ious employers in mandated prescription contraceptive coverage
laws do not cover many religious organizations other than
churches.  For example, regarding the Catholic religion,
churches, parish rectories, and seminaries would be exempted
from these types of mandates, but Catholic hospitals, Catholic
institutions of higher learning, and Catholic service organizations
such as Catholic Charities would be required to provide prescrip-
tion contraceptive coverage.243  Since providing prescription con-
traceptive coverage is contrary to Catholic religious teachings,
these nonexempt organizations may look to other solutions if
their objections to the prescription coverage mandates do not
succeed in court.
1. No Prescription Drug Coverage Offered
One alternative for religious organizations may be to refuse to
offer coverage for all prescription drugs since the mandates only
apply to employers who offer prescription drug coverage.244
Legislatures and women’s activists want to eliminate the discrim-
ination in healthcare costs between men and women, but if relig-
ious employers refuse to offer prescription coverage to everyone,
no one is better off, including women.245  Though men and wo-
men would then be treated equally, the equality may not feel like
a victory for women who would then be worse off financially.246
This would be especially problematic for women of lesser finan-
cial means who may choose to forgo contraception entirely, lead-
ing to unintended pregnancies and more medical expenses.247
242 Id.
243 See  Stabile, supra  note 56, at 171.
244 See, e.g. , CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a)(1); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.196(a)(1) (West 2005); Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 106 (Brown, J., dissent-
ing); Stabile, supra  note 56, at 179-80.
245 See, e.g. , Stabile, supra  note 56, at 180.
246 See, e.g. , id.
247 See, e.g. , Center for Reproductive Rights, supra  note 12.
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Other than potentially placing women in the position of paying
even more for healthcare, there is another major consequence if
religious employers do not offer prescription drug benefits to
employees.  If religious employers like Catholic Charities are
forced to forgo offering insurance coverage for prescription
drugs, they may have problems hiring employees.248  Benefits
packages, including health insurance plans, are an incentive to
potential employees, especially employees of organizations who
cannot pay generous salaries, like nonprofit religious organiza-
tions.249  If religious employers do not offer plans that are com-
petitive with other employers, job seekers may be less attracted
to religious employers.250  Thus, religious employers who often
work to serve the underprivileged and poor may have problems
hiring workers and remaining staffed.251  If that were to happen,
religious employers may have more difficulty providing quality
care to less fortunate members of society.252
2. Reductions in Scale for Religious Employers and Their
Services
Another option for religious employers who do not qualify for
the religious exemptions in mandated prescription contraception
coverage laws is to either cease operations entirely or severely
reduce the scale of the organization.253  If religious organiza-
tions—Catholic hospitals in particular—were forced to close be-
cause of the controversy involved in providing prescription
contraceptive coverage, the spiritual and moral dimensions of
these organizations’ business would be lost.254  The closure of
Catholic hospitals may reduce the healthcare industry to busi-
ness-model services with no regard for the spiritual or holistic
healing that Catholic hospitals often provide.255  Profit motive
and not the spiritual and moral dimensions of healthcare may
become the motivation behind the healthcare industry.256
Examples of reductions in the scale of services may include





253 See id.  at 181.
254 See Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital , 31 J.
LEGIS. 69, 126 (2004).
255 See id.
256 See id.
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employing and serving only persons who share the religious or-
ganization’s religious beliefs in order to qualify under the narrow
definitional requirements of the religious employer exemptions
of the WCEA and similar statutes.257  However, religious organi-
zations, especially Catholic hospitals that seek to focus on more
religious aspects of their businesses, may be denied public fund-
ing because the sectarian nature of the organization would be-
come too small or disappear.258
3. Greater Incursions into Religious Freedoms in the Future
A slippery slope argument can also be made regarding the con-
sequences of Catholic Charities  and narrow religious employer
exemptions to prescription contraceptive coverage mandates.
Catholic organizations in particular are concerned that mandated
prescription contraceptive coverage is only the beginning of leg-
islation requiring Catholic hospitals to provide services against
their religious tenets, such as abortions and sterilizations.259
Catholic healthcare providers see a national push toward requir-
ing Catholic hospitals to provide all reproductive services, includ-
ing abortions.260  Since emergency contraception, seen by
Catholic healthcare providers as an abortifacient, has already
been made a required service for some hospitals, Catholic orga-
nizations fear that the line between contraception and abortion
has become illusory.261  The argument that Catholic hospitals
should be required to provide the full range of reproductive ser-
vices would be strengthened if legislatures could already require
Catholic employers to provide insurance coverage for prescrip-
tion contraceptives and Catholic hospitals to administer emer-
gency contraception to patients.262
B. A Better Solution:  Broad Religious Exemptions with
Employee Purchase Options
Statutes mandating prescription contraceptive coverage should
have a religious employer exemption that accommodates the ma-
257 Stabile, supra  note 56, at 181.
258 See Nelson, supra  note 254 at 126.
259 See generally id.  (discussing how some laws have already been passed requir-
ing Catholic hospitals to provide prescription contraceptive coverage to employees
and emergency contraception to patients).
260 See id.  at 80-81.
261 Id.
262 Id.
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jority of religious employers.  This type of exemption would re-
quire a much less significant intrusion into religious freedom.
Broad exemptions would require much less entanglement and
may be more amenable to Establishment Clause concerns.263
Broad exemptions would not require excessive inquiry into the
secular versus religious components of an organization.264  Fur-
ther, broad exemptions do not trigger free exercise concerns be-
cause religious organizations would be free to declare themselves
opposed to prescription contraceptives and take the exemp-
tion.265  Religious organizations would not be forced to act in op-
position to their own beliefs under such a regime.
However, in addition to the need for religious exemptions to
prescription contraceptive mandates, there is also a need to fur-
ther the legitimate government interest in eliminating gender dis-
crimination in healthcare costs and services.  The purpose of
narrow exemptions is to ensure that as many women as possible
are covered under mandated prescription coverage laws.266
Therefore, statutes containing exemptions should also contain an
option for employees to obtain prescription contraceptive cover-
age directly from the insurer at a cost that is no more than the
employee’s pro rata share of what the employer (or group pur-
chaser) would have paid if the employer had not taken the
exemption.267
263 See California Supreme Court Upholds Compulsory Insurance Coverage of
Contraceptives over Establishment and Free Exercise Objections—Catholic Charities
of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2761, 2768 (2004).
264 The dissent in the Catholic Charities  case questioned the constitutional impli-
cations of a law that required a religious organization to provide a benefit to em-
ployees despite the organization’s theological objections.  Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 100 (Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissent-
ing).  Justice Brown’s dissent found problems with the WCEA’s exemption because
of issues regarding the government’s inquiry into the religious and secular portions
of an organization. Id.  Justice Brown argued that the government may not entangle
itself in this inquiry in order to impose a burden on the secular portion of the organi-
zation. Id.
265 See generally  Inimai M. Chettiar, Comment, Contraceptive Coverage Laws:
Eliminating Gender Discrimination or Infringing on Religious Liberties? , 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1867, 1879 (2002).
266 See Catholic Charities , 85 P.3d at 106 (Brown, J., dissenting).  The dissent
stated that there is no support for the claim that a broad exemption could potentially
affect several hundred thousand employees of employers who could possibly fall
under a broader exemption. Id.  The dissent stated that the WCEA was meant to
eliminate gender discrimination in health care costs, not to provide access to pre-
scription contraceptives. Id.
267 See, e.g. , HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(e) (Supp. 2004); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 376.1199(5) (West 2002); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(2)(A) (McKinney Supp. 2006).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 35  6-APR-06 12:28
Mandated Prescription Contraception Coverage and the Religious Employer 1261
With this solution, religious employers would not be required
to violate their religious beliefs by providing and paying for what
they view as a sin.  The government would not impose on the
establishment and free exercise rights of religious organizations.
And women would be able to obtain prescription contraceptive
coverage if they wished.  Therefore, gender discrimination in
healthcare costs would be eliminated or reduced, and religious
organizations would still maintain their religious identity and
preserve their religious values.
CONCLUSION
Coverage for prescription contraceptives is obviously an im-
portant issue.  The statistics are difficult to dispute.  Not only do
women pay more for healthcare services than men, but women
are often forced to face the consequences when prescription con-
traceptives are not covered.  These consequences include, among
other things, the costs of unwanted pregnancies.  However, relig-
ious employers have a legitimate argument that requiring them
to cover prescription contraceptives interferes with their religious
freedoms and rights.  Therefore, a program should be enacted
that requires coverage for prescription contraceptives, that ex-
empts a broad range of religious employers, and that allows em-
ployees to obtain their desired contraceptive coverage directly
through the insurer or a third party at no extra cost.
The Oregon Legislature and Congress, which have considered
mandated prescription coverage laws,268 should reevaluate the
legislation and add a broad exemption for religious employers
with an option for employees to purchase the coverage directly
from the insurer or from a third party.
268 See S.B. 756, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 2509, 73d Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); see also  discussion supra  Part II.B.1.
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